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Commentary
by U.S. Alliance for Democratic Iran
NIE on
Iran: A Nuclear Pulp Fiction
The “key judgments” of the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iran's "Nuclear Intentions and
Capabilities" were released on Monday and we can
“assess” with “high confidence” that Tehran
apologists within and outside of the
administration are spinning it as if this
“estimate” – if accurate, and that’s a big if –
has overnight triggered the metamorphism of
Tehran regime into a benevolent government.
Just a quick reality check: Four days after
release of this report, the tyrant mullahs are
still erecting gallows in Iranian cities,
cracking down on students and women, sponsoring
a wide range of Sunni and Shiite terrorist
groups in Iraq and the region, masterminding and
carrying out a bloody and destabilizing
sectarian proxy war in Iraq, and, yes, enriching
uranium- the fundamental component of a nuclear
weapon program - at full speed.
But never mind that. Tehran apologists and
almost all of those opposed to having a firm
approach toward Iran are promoting National
Intelligence Estimate – and that’s all it is, an
“estimate” - to legitimize the utterly and
always failed policy of rapprochement with
terror-spawning tyranny ruling Iran.
Well, we can say with “high confidence” that’s
repulsive; even though we have “zero to low
confidence” that this political and policy
opportunism would succeed. in 2005, the Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei, in an alliance with Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, vaccinated his
regime against the “behavioral change” virus
when he placed the former IRGC senior commander
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the office of presidency.
There are grwoing questions about policy
ramifications and possible political motives
behind the NIE “estimate,” as there are
questions about the timing and the manner in
which it was publicized. There also seem to be
questions about the analytical credibility of
the NIE in light of the past failures of the
intelligence community in understanding the true
scope and potential of Tehran’s nuclear and
other WMD programs.
On the bright side, the NIE indicates that the
intelligence community has acknowledged for the
first time that the Iranian regime had indeed a
covert nuclear weapon program, although we
differ with the NIE on whether it was halted in
the fall of 2003. The world was very much in the
dark about the scope and depth of this weapons
program until Iran’s major opposition coalition,
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),
made the ground braking revelations about Iran’s
clandestine nuclear facilities in Natanz and
Arak in August 2002. These revelations were
later verified by the IAEA inspectors in
February of 2003.
The NIE, however, loses almost all of its
analytical credibility when it’s first and only
footnote erroneously and unrealistically defines
Tehran’s “nuclear weapons program” as limited
only to “Iran’s nuclear weapon design and
weaponization work and covert uranium
conversion-related and uranium
enrichment-related work.” It does not include
“Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium
conversion and enrichment.” Anyone with a little
knowledge of proliferation issues and Tehran’s
twenty some years of conceal-and-deceive tactics
understands that operating 3,000 centrifuges to
enrich uranium is effectively a fundamental
component of a weapons program even if it is
done “overtly” and declared “civil work.
Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy writes that “Before deciding on
what the NIE means for policy, one should first
be sure what it says. The reality is that the
estimate says little about whether Iran still
aims to produce nuclear weapons or when it might
do so. The NIE's information supports the theory
that Iran has simply changed the sequencing of
its nuclear weapons effort -- not necessarily
the theory that Iran is no longer pursuing
nuclear weapons.”
In a hardly noticed section of the NIE, it lists
all of its caveats: “We use phrases such as we
judge, we assess, and we estimate—and
probabilistic terms such as probably and
likely—to convey analytical assessments and
judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof,
or knowledge. These assessments and judgments
generally are based on collected information,
which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some
assessments are built on previous judgments. In
all cases, assessments and judgments are not
intended to imply that we have “proof” that
shows something to be a fact or that
definitively links two items or issues.”
Jacqueline Shire of the Institute for Science
and International Security, says the report was
so full of caveats that "it has caveated itself
into meaninglessness. It's like eating
marshmallow fluff."
After deciphering the NIE Pulp Fiction on Iran,
we can still say with “high confidence” that,
despite some setbacks and retreats resulting
from revelations by the NCRI and international
sanctions, Tehran’s “nuclear weapons program” is
up and running at full speed, overtly and
covertly, in declared facilities or in the miles
of underground tunnels. We can say with equal
“high confidence” that more comprehensive
sanctions and a more robust diplomacy is
necessary to deal with Tehran’s nuclear menace,
although our assessment is that it is “very
unlikely” that these measures, unless augmented
by a policy of realizing democratic change in
Iran, would bring about a halt to this menace
once and for all.
(USADI)
USADI
Commentary reflects the viewpoints of the US Alliance
for Democratic Iran in respect to issues and events
which directly or indirectly impact the US policy toward
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