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Weekly Commentary
Appeasement of
Mullahs in Iran: Dangerous and Ineffectual
The European Union’s blatant appeasement of the terrorist regime
ruling Iran is deplorable and the nuclear “grand bargain” it has
offered Tehran could very well have strategic and regional
security repercussions.
Striking similar to the Neville Chamberlain’s initiative in 1938
to placate the Nazi Germany, the EU’s “dream offer” to Iran will
only embolden the mullahs to demand even more concessions from
the EU and continue their rogue behavior.
Yesterday, the second round of talks with Iran ended with
Tehran’s rejection of the core demand of the EU’s proposal: the
immediate and indefinite halt to uranium enrichment. Tehran’s
tactic of prolonging the so-called diplomatic track was in full
display when its nuclear point man Hossein Moussavian told
reporters, ”Iran could take months to agree to the EU request
since the offer was riddled with ambiguities and must be more
balanced.” It should come as no surprise that an Iranian
diplomat present at the talks said, “the negotiations were very
constructive for Iran.”
Following their now familiar pattern, the regime leaders and its
senior officials, speaking with many voices, feed the
international media with contradictory statements, never
authoritatively or decisively taking a clear stance.
Increasingly confident in light of the EU’s stance, Tehran has
hardened its position in the nuclear brinkmanship it has waged
on the world and in recent weeks it has announced the operation
of new nuclear-related facilities. Now, Tehran appears to be in
the driver’s seat. As such, EU’s reckless approach has bolstered
Iran’s nuclear arms program.
The Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
warned this week that the nuclear technology the EU has offered
Iran could indeed help it make an atomic bomb, not prevent it.
The EU’s appeasement of an innately outlaw regime will not
defuse the serious nuclear threat posed by Iran. It would also
have catastrophic consequences for U.S. security and regional
stability by unwittingly facilitating Tehran’s nuclear drive.
Engagement is an inherently dangerous policy when it comes to
dealing with terrorist, totalitarian states like Iran for it
would encourage them to continue their behavior and demand even
more concessions when they see their outlaw conduct is
economically and politically rewarded.
It was just last year that the EU’s Big-3, France, Germany, and
Britain, were trumpeting their nuclear agreement with Iran as
sign of success for use of diplomacy in dealing with rouge
states.
That was a year ago. During this period there was no shortage of
talks or leniency in dealing with Tehran. Still, Tehran
continued its campaign of cheat-and-conceal, violating the word
and spirit of the agreement and has had plenty of time to push
its clandestine nuclear weapons program forward and from all
indications is very close to the point of nuclear no return.
Intrinsically and structurally incapable of real change, the
mullahs’ regime lacks long-term stability and legitimacy.
Ensuring its permanence has been the driving force of its
domestic and foreign policy since coming to power in 1979.
Contrary to the contention of Tehran’s apologists in the EU,
Iran’s two-decade long nuclear drive is not a part of a
defensive doctrine to deal with a “dangerous neighborhood” or
“legitimate security concerns” in the aftermath of the Iraq war.
It is a core component of Tehran’s strategy of survival and
expanding its fundamentalist Islam elsewhere. It stems from the
depraved and rogue nature of the regime.
As quoted in the Middle East Defence News of July 22, 1991,
Iran’s powerful former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
told a gathering of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in
October 6, 1988, that “We should fully equip ourselves both in
the offensive and defensive use of chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapon. From now on, you should make use of the
opportunity and perform this task.”
No doubt Iran represents a clear and present danger to world’s
peace and security. The ever-shrewd Europeans may have their
commercial or geopolitical interests in mind for not wanting to
break their bridges with the mullahs. However, the specter of a
nuclear-armed Iran – the most active state sponsor of terrorism
– is far too ominous to let appeasers in the EU formulate policy
toward Tehran.
(USADI)
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The Washington Times
October 27, 2004
Group discloses
secret nuke effort
PARIS -- The Iranian opposition group that exposed the nation's
covert nuclear weapons program two years ago said yesterday that
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ordered the effort to
continue in secret.
The opposition group, the National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), also disclosed the
existence of what it said is a new uranium enrichment facility
in central Iran that is nearing completion.
Speaking to reporters in Paris yesterday, Mohammad Mohaddessin,
chairman of the NCRI's Foreign Affairs Committee, said the
Iranian regime is "playing a double game" with Europe.
"Khamenei has ordered his regime to not only continue the
enrichment of uranium, but to buy time and accelerate the
project in order to make the bomb as quickly as possible," Mr.
Mohaddessin said.
"Khamenei has ordered his diplomats and his negotiators to
prolong the negotiations as much as possible, possibly by
between eight and 12 months, which is exactly the time needed to
complete the bomb," he said.
The Bush administration and European powers have branded the
NCRI a terrorist group, mainly because its military wing was
sheltered by Saddam Hussein at bases in Iraq, from which it
launched attacks in Iran.
The group, however, gained credibility in August 2002 by
exposing another secret uranium enrichment facility being built
underground in Natanz, 150 miles south of Tehran, and a heavy
water production facility at Arak, about 120 miles southwest of
Tehran.
That exposure triggered the current nuclear standoff with Iran,
by forcing the Islamist regime to open these sites to the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Mr. Mohaddessin said that while the regime was negotiating with
Europe, it was also putting the finishing touches on a major
site that would be needed to produce large quantities of
enriched uranium.
The site, located in Isfahan in central Iran, would convert
uranium oxide, called "yellowcake," into uranium hexafluoride
gas, a stage prior to enrichment.
He said a test center for centrifuges had been constructed with
"utmost discretion" near the site, and that between 120 and 180
centrifuges will be installed there…
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Reuters
October 25, 2004
EU nuke offer could
help Iran get arms
VIENNA, Oct 25 (Reuters) - The nuclear technology the European
Union has offered Iran could help it make an atomic bomb, not
prevent it, a Washington-based think-tank warned.
The EU's "Big Three" -- France, Britain and Germany -- have
offered Iran reactor fuel and help developing light-water
reactor (LWR) technology if Tehran stops uranium enrichment, a
process which can be used to make nuclear arms.
"LWRs no longer should be considered to be safe for any nation
that might divert the reactor's fresh lightly-enriched fuel or
the plutonium-laden spent fuel to make bombs," Henry Sokolski,
head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC),
wrote in the introduction to a 62-page report.
Sokolski, a former U.S. Pentagon official, said the report was
prepared by "national authorities on nuclear chemistry,
commercial nuclear power reactors, and nuclear weapons designs".
The United States believes Iran's nuclear program is a front to
make atomic weapons and has criticized the EU trio and Russia
for engaging Iran on the issue. Instead it wants Tehran reported
to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.
LWRs use low-enriched uranium. Although this cannot be used to
fuel uranium-based weapons, which need very highly-enriched
uranium, the used fuel contains bomb-grade plutonium, which can
be separated from the other chemicals and used in weapons.
Sokolski said the EU was wrong to assume that such activities
could not be hidden from the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran hid its nuclear
programme from the IAEA for nearly two decades.
"Nations can chemically separate out -- reprocess -- the
plutonium contained in spent reactor fuel in relatively
affordable facilities that can be quite small, as little as 65
square feet, and therefore be easily hidden," Sokolski said.
Sokolski said under present IAEA inspection procedures, a
country determined to divert fuel for weapons had ample
opportunities to do so.
He said the IAEA does not conduct real-time camera monitoring of
fresh or spent fuel storage sites, but reviews tapes every 90
days. The IAEA plans to extend the review interval to one year
from 90 days were unwise, Sokolski added.
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